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IN THE SUPRElVIE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
l\1AX FAUSETT, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
GENERAL ELECTRIC CONTRACTS 
CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, 
and W1ILLIAM HOLDAWAY, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 6251 
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT. 
Max Fausett, the respondent, files this his Reply to 
the Brief of the appellant, General Electric Contracts 
Corporation. 
MOTION TO DISl\tiiSS APPEAL. 
Respondent has filed herein his Motion to Dismiss 
this Appeal because it was taken before ~ny final j udg-
nlent was entered by the Trial Court. 'The Judgment Roll 
reveals the entry of the followipg documents on the 
respective dates: Judgment on the Verdict, entered Jan-
uary 24, 1940 ; plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs, filed Jan-
uary 24, 1940; appellants' Motion For New Trial, filed 
January 26, 1940; Appellants' Motion to Retax Costs, filed 
January 29, 1940; Judgment of Remittitur, entered Feb-
ruary 19, 1940; Order Denying Motion For New Trial, en-
tered February 19, 1940; Notice of Appeal and Bond, filed 
~ebruary 21, 1940; Order Retaxing Costs entered April 25, 
1940. 
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There was no final or appealable judgment in this 
case until April 25, 1940, at which time the court made its 
order reducing plaintiff's costs by 1$18.40. ·The appeal taken 
February 21, 1940, was therefore premature. The appellant 
seems to agree with this conclusiqn and even goes further, 
for on page 29 of its brief, it says: 
"There is nothing in the record to show exactly 
what the judgment now is in this matter.'' 
It is stated in 4 C.J.S., page 204, Section 108: 
"'There is a diversity of authority as to whether 
a final judgment must include a recovery for costs. 
"In some states a j udgme;nt is not deemed 
final for the purpose of an appeal, until the costs 
:are taxed or awarded and inserted therein, unless 
under statute or rule orf court the right to cosits has 
been waived, and the judgment is complete and 
final on its face. In other jurisdictions, however, 
it is held under rtheir statutes that, although the 
costs have pot been ascertained and stated, when 
every other matter is disposed of, the judgment is 
:final for the purpose of appeal.'' 
In Perkins vs. Sierra Nev. S. M. Co., 10 Nev. 411. the 
Court quotes and approves the following: 
"A judgn1ent or decree is. final that disposes 
of the issues presented in the· case, determines the 
costs, and leaves nothing for the future considera-
tion of the court When no further action of the 
eourt is required in order to determine the rights 
of the parties in the action, it is final; when the 
case is retained for further action it is inter· 
locutory." 
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See also, 
Nevada First National Bank of Tonopah v. 
Lamb, (Nev.) 271 Pac. 691; 
Eisman vs. Eisman, (Nev.) 3 Pac. 2d, 107.1; 
Richter vs. Lukaszewicz, (Wis.) 171 N. W., 671; 
In St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. vs. Southern 
Express Co., 108 U. S. 24, 2 S. Ct. 6, 27 L. Ed., 639, 
it is stated: 
"The Supreme Court of the United States has 
defiped a final judgment for the purpose of an ap-
peal to be one that 'terminates 1the litigation be-
tween the parties on the merits of the case, and 
leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execu-
tion what has been determined'." 
Until costs are inserted, an execution could not cover 
them. 
If a judgment leaves necessary further judicial ac-
tion, it is not final. 
Freeman on Judgments, Vol. 1, 4th Edition, 
page 18; 
Shurtz vs. Thorley, 90 Utah 381, 61 Pac. 2d 
1262; 
Johnson vs. Solomons et al.~ (Cal.) 12 Pac. 2d 
140; 
Boxwell vs. Greeley Union National Bank, 
(Colo.) 5 Pac. 2d 868 ; 
Standard s~t:eam Laundry vs. Dole, 24 tJtah 
469, 58 Pac. 1109. 
In Oldroyd vs. McCrea, 65 Utah 142, 235 P. 580 at 
588, the court says a judgment is not final until it states: 
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"What the prevailing parties shall receive and 
what the losing party is required to do, pay or 
discharge, and in that way adjudicates and dis-
poses the matters in controversy." 
When the appellant contested the respondent's costs. 
it put that matter in controversy and until it was settled 
it could -not be determined how much the appellant was 
required to pay t'he respondent. 
Robison vs. Salt Lake City, 37 lTtah 520, 109 
.Pac. 816; 
Cantwell vs. M·cPherson, (Idaho) 29 Pac. 102. 
In this last case cited, the defendant recovered a 
judgment of non-suit and for his costs .. He did not file a 
Cost Bill within the statutory thne. On appeal the defe.n-
da!llt contended that the judgment was not' final because 
costs \:vere not inserted. The court agreed with the defen-
dant on ~that proposition of law, but held that the defendant 
waived his right, to file a Cost Bill and therefore the judg-
ment became final. The Idaho Statute cited by the court 
in support of its ruling is substantially the same ·as Sec-
tion 104-44-14 of the 1933 R. S. U. 
In the case of Richardson vs. Rogers, (Minn.) 35 N. 
W. 2~0, the court held: 
"The costs properly constitute a part of the 
judgment, and unless they are waived or releas·ed 
by the prevailing party, he is as much entitled to 
have them included as other relief. For the pur-
poses of an appeal ~the cases in New York and in 
Wisconsin hold under substantially similar statu-
tory provisions, that a judgment is not perfected 
until the costs are inserted and hence 1the time of 
appeal ·does not run against the defeated party 
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until they are properly taxed and included in the 
judgn1ent. 2 N. \V. 98, 32 N. W\. 42, 5 How. Pr. 360, 
45 Barb. 352, 42 Barb. 444." 
In the case of Luke vs. Avera, (Ga.) 85 S. E. 121, 
the plaintiff sued the defendant Sheriff because he re-
fused to sell certain goods under execution. After hearing, 
the court ordered the Sheriff to sell the goods and said: 
"Let the question of costs remain open for fur-
ther order. Judgment and order signed in open 
court, this March 23, 1914." 
The appeal was dismissed because the judgment was 
interlocutory. 
THE COURT ERRED IN RETAXING COSTS 
HEREIN (Abs. 85). 
On the opening day of Court, to-wit, January 16, 
1940, Sylvia Fausett, Margaret Woolsey, Rose Fausett, 
Elva Fausett and Elvan Woolsey were duly and regularly 
sworn as witnes·ses for the plaintiff (Tr. 11). These wit-
nesses, except Elvan Woolsey were in attey1dance at all 
sessions of the court, to-wit, four days, and Elvan Wool .. 
sey attended but the first session of the court, (See J udg-
ment Roll page 133). The defendants moved to limit the 
fees to two days' attendance, to-wit J~uary 16th and 
January 17th, for the first five above named, and alleged 
that Elvan Woolsey was entitled to no fee because he did 
not testify. Elvan Woolsey was sick and unable to attend 
court on the 17th and respondent's attorney wanted de-
fendant's a~ttorneys to stipulate as to what he would 
testify to if he were present (Tr. 134) but attorneys 
could not agree on his testimony. It was then discovered 
that 'his brother, Myron Woolsey, was present in court 
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and could testify to the same facts that Elvan Woolsey 
would have testified to. 
The def~dants took two days to put on their testi-
mony after vvhich respondent and plaintiff put on rebuttal 
testimony. Respondent had no vvay of calculating how 
much time defendants would need for their testimony and 
it was necessary for him to have his witnesses present in 
court to give rebuttal testimony, if necessary, as soon as 
defendants had concluded. Elvan Woolsey, after being 
sworn, was entitled to one day's fee and mileage even ·though 
he became sick thereafter and could not testify. The other 
witnesses were entitled to four days' fees. 
See, 
Crawford v.s. Abraham, 2 Oregon 163 ; 
Cole vs. Ducheneau, 13 Utah 42, 44 Pac. 92; 
Smith vs. Nelson, 23 Utah 512, 65 Pac. 485. 
Appellant General . Electric Contracts : Corporation 
grounds it appeal on three propositions set out on pages· 
10 and 11 of its Brief. The first is "1.1here is no unlawful 
repossession of the refrigerator by William Holdaway" 
for the reaso1n "that at no time was the contract ·current." 
Respondent denies t'he premise and the alleged proof 
thereof. 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT IN DEFAULT AT J)ATE OF 
REPOSSESSION OF REFRIGERATOR. 
lVIrs. Max Fausett made most of the payments (Tr. 
52). She made some :to General Electric Contracts Corpora-
tion direct (Tr. 16) and some to William Holdaway (Tr. 
258). The first monthly payment of $10.00 was due 
August 28, 1938. From that date to May 28, 1939, the 
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date of the repossession, there matured ten payments or 
a total of $100.00. ~Ir. Lyon, for appellant, said he had 
received $75.00 during that peTiod (Tr. 216) but the evi-
dence s~ows the Fausetts were not given credit for $40.00 
paid during that time as follows: $10.00 paid by Mrs. 
Fau:::ett during ··"·inte1· n1onths" of 1938-1939. She paid 
this to \Villiam Holdaway on the refrige-rator account (Tr. 
84). He, however, V\rithout authority from her, applied it 
to her priYdte accou.nt to him (Tr. 85). Holdaway never 
denied that she paid him this $10.00 on the refrigerator 
account. She ordered it paid on that account. The General 
Electric Contracts Corporation ra;tified payments by her 
to Holdaway (Tr. 236) so, that payment of $10.00 must 
be acknovvledged; $15.00 vvas paid by Max Fausett to 
'Villiam Holdavvay on the refrigerator account March 14, 
1939 (Tr. 53). ~~t the san1e time he said he paid $10.00 
on his private account vvith Holdaway. Holdavvay never 
denied .receiving this ~~15.00 and he introduced Exhibit 
Thirteen, which is a credit to Fausett of $10.00 on his 
private account on 1.\farch 14, 1939. Mr. Lyon said he 
never received that $15.00 from William Holdaway (Tr. 
237), so that payment of $15.00 must be acknovvledged. 
$15.00 was paid in currency the "fore part of Mlay," 1939 
to Holdaw·ay (Tr. 86). This payment is corroborated by 
mother of Mrs. Max Fauset~t (Tr. 115). Holdaway failed 
to send this sum to General Electric Contracts Corpora-
tion and it was never credited (Tr. 237). 
The Fauset,ts were between two cross-fires and it is 
immaterial that they did not know how much was due on 
the contract. It was the duty of the General Electric Con-
tracts Corporation and William Holdaway to treat them 
fairly and credit them with payments made on the reefrig:.. 
erator account made to both of them. $40.00 added to the 
$75.00 makes $115.00 they had paid up to "fore part of 
May," 1939. That sum took care of all payments up to and 
including the May, 1939 payment and left $5.00 over paid 
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when the refrigerator' was unlawfully repossessed on May 
28, 1939. ' 
EXTENSION OF TIME 
The responde:nt was not in default for the further 
reason that extensions of time in which to make payments 
were granted him from time to time. Exhibit A, the con-
tract, recites that time is the essence, but it also states 
that, 
"If payments are not made vvithin · fifteen days 
after due date,~' 
buyer must pay a late charge. Fifteen days' grace are thus 
specifically give
1
n, together with an undertermined fur-
ther time upon payment of late charge. The various letters 
that comprise Exhibit 8 show "late charges" made and 
show· various extensions of time. Where extensions of 
time are· granted to pay ins·tallments, the buyer is en-
titled to reasonable notice that such extensions are dis-, 
continued. 
1Columbia Airways vs. Stevens, 80 u~tah 215, 
14 Pac. 2d 984. 
Bearslee vs. North Paint Finance Corp., (Wash.) 
29·6 Pac. 155. 
The acceptance of $15.00 on "fore part of May," 1939 
by defendant Holdaway for defendapt General Electric 
Contracts Corpor~tion, waived all past defaults, by 
Fausetts, if any there were. 
tttr 
Hoppin vs Munsey (Cal.) ~ Pac. 398, 400. 
Newe1l vs. E. B. & A. L. Stone Co. (Cal.) 184 
Pac. 659. 
Noyes vs. Schlegel (Cal.) 99 Pac. 726. 
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Peck vs. Coyle (Cal.) 125 Pac. 1073. 
Drier vs. Sherwood (Colo.) 238 Pac. 38. 
Bell vs. Stadler (Idaho) 17 4 Pac. 129. 
Suburban Homes Co. vs. North (Mont.) 145 
Pac. 2 
Gray vs. Pelton (Ore.) 135 Pac. 755. 
·Corn ely vs. Campbell (Ore.) 186 Pac. 563. 
Kohler vs. Lundberg 4 Utah 339, 180 Pac. 590. 
Gosling vs. Jones, 70 Utah 49, 257 Pac. 1058. 
Cameron vs. Purbaugh (Wash.) 227 Pac. 858. 
THE DEFENDANT WILLIAM HOLD.AW A Y WAS AN 
AGE'NT OF DEFEN:DANT GENERAL ELE:CTRIC CON-
TRACTS CORPORATION 
The appellant's seeond ground for appeal: There is 
no evidence that \Villiam Holdaway was acting as agent 
for General Electric Contra_cts Corporation in repossessing 
the refrigerator, is not foupded in the evidence, in fact the 
opposite is true. Plaintiff's Exhibi't G is a blank copy of a 
trust receipt or an agreement between Carbon Furniture 
& Appliance Company, succeeded to by defendant and ap-
pellant William Holdaway, which is called the floor plap 
in the evidence (Tr. 149 and Tr. 165) and was in use by 
the appellant in the year 1938 (Tr. 175). Part of Exhibit 
G. reads: 
"The undersigned before the termination of 
this Trust may sell said property for account of 
General Electric Contracts Corporation, to a bona 
fide purchaser at r~tail for cash, for not less than 
the sum indicated in column 5 on the reverse side 
hereof as to each product covered hereby, and im-
mediately after such sale, the undersigned shall 
deliver the proceeds thereof to General Electric 
Contracts Corporation, and until such delivery shall 
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hold such pl}oceeds in trus't for General Electric 
'Contracts Corporation separate from the funds of 
the undersigned." 
"The undersigned" on this document, of course, is 
Carbon Furniture & Appliance Company. Pu:r~suant to the 
authority in Exhibit G the General Electric Contracts 
Corporation furnished Carbon Furniture & Appliance 
Company with Conditional Sale Contracts in blank, and on 
July 7, 1938 the Carbon Furniture & Appliance Company 
sold respondent the refrige·rator and drew the contract 
on one of those blanks (Exhibit A) on which appea~s these 
words in addition to the contract: 
"Original for General Electric Contracts Corp-
oration." 
At the end of the co,ntract, these words also appeared: 
"Buyers credit statement must be filled out 
and dealer must execute assignment." 
'These are words of a command from a pri:ncipal to 
his agent or master to his servant. 
Part of Exhibit B is : 
"All warranties, terms and provisions of an 
agreement between the undersigned · and General 
Electric Contracts Corporation are made a part here-
of by reference; and upon which Geperal Electric 
Contracts Corporation relies upon making this 
purchase." 
By the provisions of the floor plan, the dealer (Car-
bon Furniture & Appliance Company) paid 10% on ,the 
refrigerator in question to Graybar Electric Company. 
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.A.fter the dealer signed the trust receipt, Exhibit G, the 
Carbon Furniture & Appliance Company was under no 
further obligation to Graybar Electric Company. General 
Electric Contracts Corporation then paid Graybar the 
balance on the refrigerator and thereafter the Carbon 
Furniture and Appliance Company disposed of the refriger-
ator "for an account of General Electric Co_;ntracts Corpor-
ation" and was obliged ''to deliver the proceeds thereof" 
to General Electric Contracts Corporation (Tr. 151-152). 
This is a principal and agent set-up. 
The "warranty, terms and provisions of an agree-
ment," mentioned in Exihibt B, referred to defendants' 
Exhibit 1 which is Application And Agreement of Carbon 
Second Hand Store of Price, U~tah, which is none other 
than Carbon Furniture & Appliance Company, succeeded 
to by the defendant William Holdaway. Part of this agree·-
ment recites: 
"You sha:ll have the sole right to make col-
lections on all Accounts and we agree not to solicit 
or make any co11ections or repossession in respect 
to any Accounts sold to you, nor to accept the re-
turn of nor make any substitution of any Equip-
ment covered thereby except pursuapt to your in-
structions, and to forward to you promptly all 
communications, inquiries or remittances, which 
we may receive in reference to said Accounts." 
Pursuant to those provisions the defendant William 
Holdaway could not solicit or make collections from Max 
Fausett or repossess the refrigerator "except pursuant" to 
instructions f~om the appellant General Electric Contracts 
Corporation. Pursuant to Exhibit G and Exhibit B and 
Exhibit One, General Electric Contracts Corporation be-
came the owner of the Fausett contract. Pursuant to Ex-
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hibit One General Electric ·Contracts Corporation advised 
William Holdaway as follows: 
Exhibit 8, letter of November 9, 1938> appell¥t 
General Electric Contracts Corporation requested defen-
dant William Holdaway to, 
"contact the customer at once to see that the 
customer makes his pay1nents.'' 
Exhibit 8, letter of November 22, 1938: 
" ..... advise what arrangements you have 
m·ade with the customer if you have not collected 
the September and October 29 instalm~nts." 
Exhibit 8, letter of March 23, 1939: 
"Dear Bill : 
"It will be possible for you to take the refriger-
lator without having to take replevin action. If you 
once get hold of it, don't give it back to him until 
he pays ·the entire balance of $81.64, plus $2.50 late 
charges. Will you please advise me what results you 
have on this account. 
H. P. Gough." 
Exhibit 8, letter of May 11, 1939: 
"Dear Bill : 
"If you have not already done so, suggest you 
replevin the merchandise." 
Exhibit 10, page 2, 
"Customer refuses to pay as agreed. You are re-
~ossessing." 
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These are all "rords of con1mand from a principal to 
his age~t or a master to his servant, and it· makes no 
difference \\7hich. The facts are: Notwithstanding, Hold-
away had collected . from Fausett $15.00 currency a short 
time be:fore receiving this order to repossess and had fail-
ed to send it to the General Electric. Contracts Corpora-
tion, he waited until the Fausetts were all away from 
home and then took the refrigerator upon demand of ap-
pellant General Electric Contracts Corporation. 
Under Exhibit G a·nd Exhibit One, the General Elec-
tric Contracts Corpora;tion controlled the acts of William 
_Holda\vay in connection with the Fausett contract. 
"If such a right or control belongs to the 
principal or master the per~on doing the work is 
not an independent contractor, but is an agent or 
servant. It is to be noted in this connection that it 
is not actual interference in the work that denotes 
the agency, it is the right to interfere that makes 
the cliff erence between an independent contract and 
a servant or agent.'' Chatalain vs. Thackery, 
----Utah , 100 Pac. 2d at 199. 
Appellanrt not only had the right to interfere in the 
Fausett contract because it required Holdaway to sign an 
agreement, Exhibit One, which .recites: 
"You (General Eelctric Contracts Corpora--
tion) shall have the sole right to make collections 
on all Accounts and we agree not to solic.it or make 
allY collections or repossessions ~n respect to any 
A~counts sold to you, nor to accept the return or 
not make any substitution of any Equipment cov-
ered thereby except pursuant to your instructio:ns, 
and to forward to you promptly all communications, 
inquiries or rem·ittances, which we may receive 
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in reference to said Accounts," 
but it actually did interfere· in Jhe collection ¥d re-
possession of the Fausett refrigerator. It ordered Hold-
away to make contacts with and collect from Fausetts. 
Pursuant to such order he made some collections he never 
sent in. It ordered him to repossess (Exhibit Ten) and 
acting upon that order, he did repossess the refrigerator 
(Tr. 83). ~xhibtt One gives appellant the right to demand 
that l-Ioldaway repossess as well as repurchase the con-
tract. By that agreen1ent General Electric Contracts 
Corporation protected itself not only with the financia~ 
ability of Holdaway, but it further protected itself with 
the right of "repossession" of the property. The plaiintiff 
has fully and completely es,tablished the agency of Hold-
away to appell~nt. Exhibits A, B. One and Ten all show 
that only the person who owned the title to the refriger-
ator, held ~the power and authority to repossess it. As 
late as June 28, 1939, at least thirty days after the 
unlawful repossessiop, the appellant General Electric 
Contracts Corporation still owned the legal title to the 
refrigerator and had in its possession Exhibit A, the Con-
tract of Sale. Exhibit H is ap assignment in blank dated 
June 28, 1939, signed by J. H. Strube. It is found on 
rthe same sheet as Exhibit B. It was in existance when the 
contract was returned from appellant's New York office 
to its Salt Lake City office (Tr. 300). June 19, 1939, the 
Contract of Sale was in the New York office (Tr. 89) and 
it remained there until June 28, 1939, as aforesaid. Only 
the appellant General Electric ·Contracts Corporation 
could legally order a repossession and it did so order it on 
May 12, 193!) (Exhibit Ten), and its agent, William Hold-
away, u:nder that order, unlawfully repossessed respon-
dent's refrigerator on that date. We subm'it there was 
sufficient evidence for the Jury to find and William Hold-
away was the agent of the General Elec.tric Contracts 
Corporation in repossessing the refrigerator, and the ap-
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pellant.s' second g·round for appeal must fail. 
INSTRU·CTIONS OF THE COURT 
The appellant's Third Ground for Appeal is based on 
alleged errors in the Court's instructions as to damages. 
The Court instructed the Jury generally on the sub-
ject of damages correctly. If appellant had desired any 
specific instn1ctions on damages, it was its duty to make 
such request. It did not do so, so it cannot now complain. 
See, 
Griffins vs. Clift, 4 Utah 462, 11 Pac. 609. 
Thackery vs. Union Portland Cement Co., 64 
Utah 437, 231 Pac. 813. 
Re Hans~1's vVill, 50 Utah 207, 167 Pac. 256. 
Everts vs. 'Vorrell, 58 Utah 238: 197 Pac. 1043. 
Even if the court erred in not instructing the Jury 
that they must deduct the amount unpaid on the con-
tract from the value of the refrigerator, such error was 
harmless because plaintiff eliminated from the judgment 
the amount G~eral Electric Contracts Corporation claim-
ed still due, to-wit, $66.64 (Judgment Roll page 141). 
Such remittitur was allowed by the court (Judgment Roll 
page 145). If the court were in error by failing to speci-
fically instruct as to damages, a new trial should not be 
granted on that point because ~the said remittitur has ac-
complished what a new trial would do on that objection. 
The repossession was unlawful, as pointed out above. 
On the 19th day of June, 1939, the appellant' still had the 
contract of sale (it was then in its New York office for 
safe keeping. Tr. 184). Respondent was not in default, as 
pointed out above. On that date, respond~nt tendered ap-
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pellant payment of $66.75, which ~was a few cents more 
than the amount claimed by appellant (Exhibit D). Ap-
pellant's agent William Holdaway, told Elva Fausett, 
mother of respondent and plaintiff Max Fausett, a day 
after repossession, that the refrigerator was ;taken "to 
protect it," because respondent's house . was vacant and 
that Holdavvay had told the company i1t was vacant (Tr. 
129). This agent further told her that she could have the 
refrigerator back by paying the full balance of $66.64 
(Tr. 1:29). Pursuant to 'that promise, Mrs. Max Fausett, 
wife of respondent, tendered the appellant payment, as 
aforesaid. The check was refused, not because it was not 
a currency payment, but ·because the agent said ·Hold-
away elaimed the Fausetts still owed him on a private 
account (Tr. 90). In the first part of June, 1939 (Tr. 135) 
!foldaway would have given the refrigerator back to the 
Fausetts if they had paid him the balance of the private 
account against them (Tr. 137). The remittitur was not 
made because respondent owed the $66.64, because the 
evidence shows he only owed $26.64 to finish paying the 
contract out, but it was made becuase appellant claimed 
there VV"as $66.64 still due. Respond~nt gave up the $40.00 
differ~ce so as to evade any possibility of a New Trial on 
the Court's failure to instruct that the balance due on the 
refrigerator should be deducted from the present value 
thereof. 
Appellant, in its Brief, points out alleged discrepancy 
betvv-een witnesses concerning the depreciation of the re-
frigerator. The Jury , exercised its rights to believe one 
wi,tness against another and the appellant cannot disturb 
its verdict on that point \vhere there is some evidence to 
support the verdict. 
This case reveals a situation ~here the parties were 
not dealing at arm's length, but it is a situation where a 
powerful corporation dictates all the terms of the contract, 
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everyone of vvhich is to its advantage. It then trus,ts the 
collection of it to an agent who has a private account 
against the buyer. The buyer is careless with his receipts 
and he does not know at any tim.e just how much he owes 
on the contract. The agent misapplied at least $10.00 paid 
to him on the contract, and credited it to his private ac-
count against the buyer. He, the agent, failed to account 
entirely for $30.00 more paid to him on the contract. The 
corporation becomes impatient and orders repossession, 
not knowing the account is not in default. The corporation 
is not to be punished because it is powerful and technical 
in its contracts, nor because it demands what is due it on 
the due date ; but everything it did and everything , its 
agents said and did tha,t benefit these unsophisticated 
buyers should be strictly construed agaipst the corporation 
and ¥1 !he favor of the buyer. They were not on equal 
terms with 'the corporation. They were completely 'vitliin 
its power and this court should see to it that that power 
was not abused. 
The Appeal should be disinis.sed and the Judgment 
allowed to stand with the addition of $18.40 to plaintiff'~ 
costs, which sum was deducted by the court from the 
Plaintiff's Cost Bill, without authority of law. 
Respectfully submitted. 
F. B. HAMMOND, 
Respondent's Attor~ey 
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